Saturday, September 27, 2014

The Bwera Model and the Problem of Funding

Earlier this week, there was a worker strike at Bwera. The funds that had been raised by the community were running dry. Unfortunately the pledges, which are around $150 USD, are rather costly for the community members at Bwera (Rwanda's GDP per capita is around $632 USD). As a result, it takes time for contributors to honor the full amount of their pledges, and do so in parts. However, this can make it difficult to continue to pay workers in a timely manner.

However, enough money was scrounged up due to a short-term loan, to cover a few days’ worth of wages. This should be enough to pay the workers until the completion of the roof of the church at Bwera. While the strike has been overcome, the funding issue is indicative of a larger problem for the Bwera Model. The funding problem stems from several previous events, where wind and rain caused a portion of the wall to collapse. As a result, construction was delayed several times. This meant that more funds had to be devoted to paying wages. Considering that the success and sustainability of projects like Bwera are propped up by tenuous pillars, it is crucial that issues with funding do not derail these efforts.


When considering the replicability of the Bwera Model, there may be several ways to mitigate the issue of funding. The issue could be ameliorated through a form of either unconditional or conditional cash transfers and to the members of the community to subsidize their contributions to the projects to allow them to contribute to the project in a timelier manner. Additionally, instead of cash transfers, members of the community could receive long-term, interest-free loans so that they can pay off their pledges over a longer period of time without having to worry about project timelines. Instead of focusing on an individual basis, the entire project could also be subsidized. Through either a matching campaign or a set-price subsidy or through a micro-grant process, subsidizing the entire campaign could take a bit of the pressure off the members of the communities while helping ensure that the project reaches completion.

I am personally inclined to favor a matching subsidy, as it still encourages community members to invest in the project. This also has its problems, as it increases the incentive for individuals to defect. This incentive could be counteracted by using the matching subsidy to unilaterally and equally decrease pledge amounts, In order to truly know which methodology would be most effective, tests and experiments would have to be run with a large and diverse sample size that consists of projects across multiple contexts. 

Sunday, September 7, 2014

The Rwandan Context and the Problem of Replicability

In my previous post, I discussed the community with which I will be engaging and my role within my accompaniment of that community, mostly pertaining to the community-driven primary school development project in Bwera. As I previously mentioned, Bwera is managing to overcome the pernicious effects of the collective action problem. In community development projects where the end result is a public good, the most logical action for an individual is to opt out of committing time or money to a project, according to game theory. I mentioned, that despite the logic of collective action problems, Bwera has had strong initial success with the development of the school and has plans to enact future community driven projects. They have managed to do this through the application of the community organizing practices of PICO, primarily one-to-one interactions with members of the community. If this model of development proves to be sustainable and replicable, it could provide an alternative to the inefficient and ineffective development practices currently being implemented by most of the international community. However, as I also mentioned, there are several reasons why this method’s effectiveness may be specific to the Rwandan context and not replicable in other countries. In this post, I will expound upon this point and delve into the possible factors that may prevent this method from being widely implemented.

Social Institutions

There are two societal institutions in Rwanda that may be improving the effectiveness of this method. The first of these is the country’s traditional practice of pooling together resources that could be given to community members in their time of need. While this practice is not specific to the Rwandan people, this institution provides a historical precedent of cooperation for the promotion of community welfare within the country. Additionally, despite the ethnic violence known as the Rwandan Genocide, the culmination of ethnic conflict that arose during Rwanda’s independence in 1960, precolonial Rwanda was a relatively homogeneous society ruled by a strong central authority. According to Nicola Gennaioli and Ilia Rainer’s Precolonial Centralization and Institutional Quality in Africa[1] have shown that strong precolonial political institutions have led to greater rule of law in post-colonial African States. This research superficially backs up the assertion that the strong centralization and political institutions of precolonial Rwanda may facilitate modern cooperation within the Rwandan state and within Bwera specifically. Additionally, approximately 80% of Rwandans today participate in a practice known as Umuganda. Umuganda is a countrywide institution that involves community members working together on community improvement projects (cleaning communal areas, improving church or mosque infrastructure, etc…) and it occurs on the last Saturday of each month. Umuganda effectively creates several iterations to the collective action problem. The addition of multiple trials to the game facilitates cooperation by reducing uncertainty. As a result, collective action becomes less of a problem and is more likely to be seen as a realistically achievable goal.

Legacy of Genocide

In addition to Rwandan institutions, the legacy of genocide in the country may be aiding the success of community-driven development projects in Bwera. In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF transitioned into the dominant political coalition within Rwanda. A highly structured organization, the RPF’s transition from a military organization to a political group led to the development of a strong bureaucracy within the country. Additionally, in the wake of the bloodletting, the new Rwandan government prioritized reconciliation, and later, economic development. The highly structured bureaucratic system put in place after the genocide in 1994 is one of the highest functioning governments on the continent. Strong political institutions have the ability to permeate through society and beget and reinforce other beneficial institutions. Perhaps the strong capacity of Rwanda’s central government has led to stronger local capacities. Additionally, the consequences and scars of the genocide are a stark reminder of the cost of noncooperation within the country. Furthermore, these community projects are associated with the Lutheran Church, which did not exist during in Rwanda until after the genocide. As a result, the Church does not bear the stigma of genocidal collaboration that mars several other faith groups (Muslims excluded) in the country. This too may facilitate the community-building and development projects of the Lutheran Church by painting the faith in a better light than some of its contemporaries.

Development Externalities

The last major factor that could explain why this project has been so successful is related to the massive economic development that Rwanda has experienced over the last decade. Over the past few years, Rwanda has continually had one of the highest rates of economic expansion in the world. It is possible that the community-driven projects are merely a positive externality of this larger trend of the state-led and aid-based economic development initiatives within the country. Just as institutions beget institutions, so too does development beget development. For example, an increase in the country’s economic production can lead to greater prosperity and more expendable income, thus mitigating time inconsistency problems and lowering the opportunity costs of participating in community development projects. Additionally, the government and aid-led economic progress in their country allows Rwandans to see the tangible effects of development projects. The sight of success alongside the promise of success can help illuminate the benefits of engaging in community-led development projects, like the primary school in Bwera.

While all of these factors may facilitate the implementation of the development projects in Bwera, it is not possible to discount the replicability of this method of development without further information. Throughout the year, I hope to gain a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of Bwera, the Rwandan context, and the methodology of the community-led development approach. In the end, however, I feel that it is impossible to truly discount the replicability of this approach without empirical evidence and evaluation. While that may be infeasible during this year, I sincerely intend and hope to acquire empirical analysis of the Bwera model.




[1] Rainer and Gennaioli, “Precolonial Centralization and Institutional Quality in Africa,” October 2005.